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BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT: OBSTACLES
TO DISCOVERY IN CLAIMS AGAINST
CHINESE COUNTERFEITERS
Minning Yu*
What is the proper method for U.S. litigants to obtain evidence located in
a foreign country for trademark litigation in the United States? The
Lanham Act authorizes trademark owners to recover profits made from the
sale of goods that infringe on their trademarks. In order to account for and
ultimately recover these profits, trademark owners need access to the
infringers’ bank records. But access to such records can be a challenge
when the infringers and their banks are located outside the United States.
In recent years, several brand owners have instituted a series of
trademark infringement lawsuits in the Southern District of New York
against Chinese vendors selling counterfeit goods online. This Note focuses
on the conflict within the Southern District of New York over whether the
Hague Convention or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the
appropriate method for obtaining bank records from Chinese banks. At
issue is the lack of transparency in the Chinese legal system, leaving the
U.S. courts in need of guidance. Ultimately, this Note endorses a
presumption against the Hague Convention whenever cooperation from the
foreign sovereign is unclear. This Note argues that this policy will
incentivize sovereign states to be more accomodating with their handling of
foreign requests for evidence and any conflicting laws that might hinder
such production.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine your surprise when you discover that in your efforts to shop for
deals online, you inadvertently purchased counterfeit goods. Surprise turns
into outrage when you learn that the website was specifically designed to be
misleading as to the authenticity of its products. Brand owners incur
similar outrage and economic harm when their customers are
unsuspectingly deceived by these counterfeit websites.
Counterfeit trademark goods,1 and the economic harm they cause to
trademark owners, have reached global proportions due in part to the
internet and the advent of the online marketplace.2 The internet hosts a
1. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
defines “counterfeit trademark goods” as “any goods, including packaging, bearing without
authorization a trademark which is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of
such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark,
and which thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the
law of the country of importation.” Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights art. 51 n.14(a), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]; see also 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21(a) (2012) (defining “counterfeit trademark” as “a spurious trademark that is
identical to, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered trademark”).
2. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS 1 (2012), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/121312%20Notorious%20Markets%20List.pdf
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multitude of websites dedicated to the sale of counterfeit products3 and
online marketplaces like Taobao,4 eBay, and Alibaba have since replaced
traditional Chinatown markets as major outlets for counterfeit goods.5 The
internet is an attractive medium for retailers of counterfeit trademark goods
because it provides user anonymity, access to a global consumer base, and
seamless transition to new websites and marketplaces with relative ease.6
Although trademark owners can benefit from electronic records and
payment trails created by online sales, enforcement of intellectual property
rights against infringement over the internet is susceptible to many
procedural and technical difficulties.7 Therefore, robust enforcement of
intellectual property rights today requires tools and strategies specifically
tailored to combating infringement over the internet.

(“Trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a commercial scale continue to thrive
around the world in part because of the presence of marketplaces that deal in goods and
services that infringe intellectual property rights.”); see also Doug Palmer & Melanie Lee,
Special Report: Faked in China: Inside the Pirates’ Web, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/26/us-china-counterfeit-idUSTRE69P1AR20101026
(“‘The Internet has just completely changed the face of the problem, made it more
complicated and more pervasive,’ says John Morton, assistant secretary in charge of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ‘Whole industries now have been attacked,
not from the street, but from the Internet.’”).
3. A search for the words “Gucci handbags outlet” on Google generates about
8,200,000 results. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); see also
Jenny T. Slocum & Jess M. Collen, The Evolving Threat and Enforcement of Replica Goods,
33 W. NEW ENGL. L. REV. 789, 796 (2011) (“Any person searching for a cheap version of
their favorite goods can find and access them on a multitude of websites. This access has
introduced counterfeit goods into every home in the world that has an Internet connection.”).
4. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) compiles an annual list of notorious
markets “that are reportedly engaged in substantial piracy and counterfeiting.” See USTR,
supra note 2, at 1. Although Taobao was not included in the notorious markets lists for 2012
because it has since taken action to “clean up its site,” Taobao, along with Alibaba, was
mentioned in the 2012 list and was included in the monthly lists from 2010 and 2011 “for
[its] widespread availability of counterfeit and pirated goods in its electronic marketplace.”
Id. at 2; see USTR, OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS, DECEMBER 20, 2011, at
3 (2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3215; USTR, OUT-OF-CYCLE
REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS, FEBRUARY 28, 2011, at 2 (2011), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2595; see also Memorandum from Travis D. Johnson,
Vice President, Int’l AntiCounterfeiting Coal., to Stanford McCoy, Asst. U.S. Trade
Representative for Intellectual Prop. and Innovation 16 (Feb. 10, 2012) [hereinafter IACC
Memorandum 2012], available at http://4356049642aa3c99a6e91c99180a8219894d6198.
gripelements.com/pdf/member-resources/iacc_special_301_2012_final.pdf (naming Taobao
as the online trade platform in China it was most concerned with and expressing
dissatisfaction with Taobao’s “take down” procedures).
5. USTR, 2012 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 15 (2012), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/2012%20Special%20301%20Report_0.pdf (“Continued growth in the
online sale of pirated and counterfeit hard goods that will soon surpass the volume of such
goods sold by street vendors and in other physical markets.”).
6. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY 14 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/industry/
industryandglobalisation/38707619.pdf (describing the factors driving the use of the internet
by counterfeiters).
7. See infra Part I.C–D.
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The Second Circuit has held that online marketplace proprietors, like
eBay, are not secondarily liable for trademark infringing products sold by
third parties on their websites.8 Thus, trademark owners seeking to enforce
their rights must pursue parties who actually sell or use their infringing
marks. Remedies like default judgments and injunctive relief are available
options,9 but they ultimately fall short of providing real monetary recovery
or permanence.10 Hence, trademark rights will continue to be threatened
and economic harm suffered absent another solution.
Cutting off the funds that finance counterfeiting operations, via the
Lanham Act,11 could be that solution. Designer brands Tiffany and Co. and
Gucci America, Inc. have recently commenced a series of trademark
infringement suits in the Southern District of New York against multiple
individuals for selling counterfeit trademark goods online.12 These luxury
brand owners are seeking relief in the form of asset restraints and an
accounting of profits under the Lanham Act with the goal of recovering the
profits made from these online sales. The defendants in these suits all
reside in China and have all failed to appear before the court.13 So, Tiffany
and Gucci have attempted to access the defendants’ profits through their
banks; namely Bank of China (BOC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China (ICBC), and China Merchants Bank (CMB) (collectively, the

8. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding
that the internet marketplace proprietor was not liable for direct trademark infringement in
the use of a jewelry seller’s mark on its website or contributory trademark infringement
despite the proprietor’s generalized knowledge of infringement).
9. See, e.g., Default Judgment & Permanent Injunction Order at 6, Tory Burch LLC v.
Yong Sheng Int’l Trade Co., No. 10 Civ. 9336 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2011), available at
http://www.iplawalert.com/uploads/file/Tory%20Burch%20v_%20Yong%20Sheng.pdf
(order granting permanent injunction and default judgment for $4,000,000 per defendant).
10. See Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum & David Ewen, Catch Me If You Can: An Analysis of
New Enforcement Measures and Proposed Legislation To Combat the Sale of Counterfeit
Products on the Internet, 32 PACE L. REV. 567, 569 (2012) (describing the impracticality of
pursuing default judgments against infringing websites); see also Memorandum from Robert
Barchiesi, President, Int’l AntiCounterfeiting Coal., to Stanford McCoy, Asst. U.S. Trade
Representative for Intellectual Property and Innovation 19 (Feb. 15, 2011) [hereinafter IACC
Memorandum 2011], available at http://4356049642aa3c99a6e91c99180a8219894d6198.
gripelements.com/pdf/member-resources/2011_special_301_iacc_final.pdf (discussing the
costs and difficulties in investigating and taking down listings of stand-alone websites,
especially when “online counterfeiters are operating through tens, hundreds and in some
cases thousands of separate platforms and domain names”).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006).
12. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bagsmerchant, LLC (Gucci II), No. 10 Civ. 2911(SAS), 2012
WL 4468192 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse (Tiffany II), No. 11
Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 1918866 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Dong
(Tiffany III), No. 11 Civ. 2183(GBD)(RM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012); Gucci Am., Inc. v.
Weixing Li (Gucci I), No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2011 WL 6156936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011);
Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi (Tiffany I), 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
13. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *1; Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1; Tiffany
I, 276 F.R.D. at 145.
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Banks).14 However, the Banks have resisted complying with discovery,
citing Chinese bank secrecy laws.15
The courts have two legal avenues by which to compel compliance with
discovery in these cases: the Hague Convention and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 45. Per Second Circuit precedent, judges must apply a
multifactor test to determine which avenue is more appropriate in a given
case. But despite the similarities of the cases before the Southern District,
the test has not produced uniform results. This Note explores the analyses
several judges have used and argues that the inconsistency within the
district for how to reach Chinese nonparty banks is due primarily to a lack
of information and transparency regarding how China handles Hague
Convention requests. By illustrating this issue and filling in this
information gap, this Note hopes to assist trademark owners in their quest
for protection and recovery in China.16
Part I of this Note studies trademarks and infringement, specifically
examining the rights afforded to trademark owners; global counterfeiting
and its implications; and the developments and procedural difficulties of
trademark rights enforcement. Part II reviews several recent trademark
infringement suits in the Southern District of New York, which collectively
demonstrate the problems courts and trademark owners face in enforcing
trademark rights against Chinese infringers. Part III then suggests a
uniform approach for courts to adopt when encountering transparency
issues in foreign legal systems, with the hopes of improving the protection
of U.S. trademark rights.
I. THE REACH OF U.S. TRADEMARK LAW TO ONLINE MARKETPLACES
SELLING COUNTERFEIT TRADEMARK GOODS FROM CHINA
This part provides an overview of trademarks and infringement, China’s
role as a major source of counterfeit trademark goods, and the rise in online
sales of counterfeit goods. It then explores the areas of law and procedural
methods commonly employed to stop the sale of counterfeit consumer
goods online. Finally, it focuses on the discovery process for evidence
located outside the United States for U.S.-based trademark litigation.

14. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *1; Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1; Tiffany
I, 276 F.R.D. at 145.
15. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *2; Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1; Tiffany
I, 276 F.R.D. at 145.
16. The issues presented in this Note address disputes beyond trademark infringement
and China, implicating U.S.-based litigation involving evidence located abroad in general.
Foreign defendants could potentially use foreign banks as shields from plaintiffs attempting
to access their funds and bank records. Conversely, compelling banking institutions to
succumb to discovery orders in every jurisdiction where they conduct business could be a
serious impediment to the trade and banking industry.
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A. Trademarks and Infringement
There are three main forms of intellectual property rights in the United
States: patents, copyrights, and trademarks.17 Patents protect new, useful
and nonobvious inventions;18 copyrights protect tangible original works of
authorship, such as writings, music, and art;19 and trademarks serve as
source identifiers.20 A trademark is defined as “any word, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof” that can be used to identify and
distinguish the goods of a manufacturer or seller from those manufactured
or sold by others.21 Protected trademarks can range from the name of a
company, like Gucci, to a specific and distinctive color that can identify the
source of the goods, like robin’s-egg blue22 for Tiffany.23 Naturally,
consumer goods, and luxury goods in particular, benefit from registered
trademark protection.
The Lanham Act provides federal protection for trademarks used in
commerce.24 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is the
federal agency that grants patents and registers trademarks.25 While
registration with the USPTO is not required in order to receive federal
protection under the Lanham Act, registration does provide several
advantages.26 Registration with the USPTO serves as “notice to the public
of the registrant’s claim of ownership of the mark, a legal presumption of
ownership nationwide, and the exclusive right to use the mark on or in
connection with the goods or services set forth in the registration.”27
Owners of registered trademarks also benefit from seizures made by U.S.

17. See Trademark, Patent, or Copyright?, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/
trademarks/basics/definitions.jsp (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
18. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–318 (2006).
19. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102–1332 (2006).
20. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006).
21. Id. § 1127.
22. Registration No. 2,416,794.
23. See generally 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 7–14 (4th ed. 2012).
24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141. Trademark protection is also available under state
unfair competition laws (both statutory and common law). See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 23,
§ 22:10 (summarizing state trademark registration provisions); see also Dennis S. Corgill,
Measuring the Gains of Trademark Infringement, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1909, 1910 n.5
(1997) (“Injunctions also are available in actions brought under state common law as well as
state trademark registration, unfair competition, and antidilution statutes.”). This Note
focuses primarily on federal trademark rights under the Lanham Act.
25. See The USPTO: Who We Are, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/about/index.jsp
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1).
26. The Lanham Act provides protection for both federally registered marks and
common law (unregistered) marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (protection for registered marks);
id. § 1125(a) (protection for unregistered, common law marks). Registration with the
USPTO provides the benefit of serving as prima facie evidence of validity, but ownership of
a mark ultimately goes to the first user of the mark. See id. § 1057(b)–(c); 2 MCCARTHY,
supra note 23, § 16:1 (discussing the first-in-time, first-in-right rule).
27. Trademark, Patent, or Copyright?, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/
basics/definitions.jsp (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1072.
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Customs and Border Protection (CBP).28 In certain situations, trademark
infringement can also lead to federal criminal liability as well.29 Congress
enacted the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984,30 criminalizing conduct
that formerly had been subject only to civil penalties because it felt that
penalties under the Lanham Act had “been too small, and too infrequently
imposed, to deter counterfeiting significantly.”31
It is a violation of the Lanham Act to use a valid trademark in commerce
without the consent of the trademark owner.32 Any person who uses any
“reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation” of a mark in
commerce where confusion as to the origin of the good is likely, will be
liable to the owner of the trademark.33 Thus, any individual that
manufactures and sells goods bearing the name “Gucci” or the color
robin’s-egg blue, other than the rightful owners of these trademarks, will be
liable to Gucci or Tiffany, respectively.34 Civil remedies available to
owners of trademarks that have been infringed upon include injunctive
relief, an accounting of the infringer’s profits, and damages.35 Where
appropriate, treble damages, attorney fees, and costs may be recovered as
well.36
B. China’s Role in Global Counterfeiting
In 2012, the CBP made “22,848 intellectual property rights seizures with
a manufacturer’s suggested retail value of $1.26 billion.”37 Goods from
China accounted for 72 percent of the total retail value.38 The commodities
28. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(b) (2012) (authorizing detention and seizure of counterfeit
trademark goods).
29. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006). The Department of Justice’s Computer
Crime and Intellectual Property Section, along with the National Intellectual Property Rights
Coordination Center, investigates and prosecutes criminal intellectual property infringement.
See About CCIPS, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/about/ (last
visited Mar. 19, 2013); About Us Partners, NAT’L INTELL. PROP. RTS. COORDINATION
CENTER, http://www.iprcenter.gov/about-us (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). This Note focuses
primarily on civil liability. For a detailed report of the DOJ’s criminal investigations and
prosecutions of intellectual property offenses, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRO IP ACT
ANNUAL REPORT FY2011 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/iptaskforce/
proipact/doj-pro-ip-rpt2011.pdf.
30. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2320).
31. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES 86 (3d ed.
2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ipma2006.pdf (quoting
S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, 3631).
32. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a).
33. Id. § 1114(1)(b).
34. A finding of trademark infringement is determined by the likelihood of confusion
and the alleged infringer’s use of the mark. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, §§ 23:1–:90
(detailing the likelihood of confusion test).
35. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116–1117.
36. See id. § 1117.
37. Intellectual Property Rights Fact Sheet, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Dec.
2012), http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/trade/ipr_fact_sheet.ctt/
ipr_fact_sheet.pdf.
38. See id.

2994

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

most often seized were consumer electronics, footwear, pharmaceuticals,
optical media, and apparel.39
China’s role as a major source for counterfeit trademark goods can be
attributed to economic, enforcement, and even cultural factors. The U.S.
International Trade Commission has reported that “globalization and the
spread of technology” has allowed for “simple and low-cost duplication of
popular products, as well as packaging and labeling.”40 The move of U.S.
and other manufacturing operations to Asia increased opportunities in both
the production process and import supply chain for counterfeiting.41 Weak
local enforcement and high thresholds for investigating and prosecuting
counterfeiters also help perpetrate global counterfeiting in China.42 The
profitability of counterfeiting has even led to the rise of the “Shan Zhai”
cultural phenomenon, which means “‘to copy’ and ‘to parody’ as selfaware, casual, and public behavior by ordinary citizens.”43 Some “Shan
Zhai” companies in China have become so successful that they dominate
the industries upon which they infringe.44
A prominent example of this cultural phenomenon, and the increasingly
brazen infringement methods to which it has given rise, is the 2011
discovery of fake Apple stores in China.45 Bearing the same distinctive
interior design and employee uniforms of Apple stores, these stores looked

39. See id.
40. China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and Indigenous Innovation
Policies on the U.S. Economy, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N., 2-6 (May 2011) [hereinafter
China: Effects of Infringement], available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub
4226.pdf.
41. See id.
42. See IACC Memorandum 2011, supra note 10, at 10 (stating that China’s high
thresholds for investigating and prosecuting counterfeiters represent a “significant barrier to
effective enforcement”); see also Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China,
EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/china/doingbizinchina/riskmanagement/ipr/index.asp (last
visited Mar. 19, 2013) (listing “corruption and local protectionism, limited resources and
training available to enforcement officials, and lack of public education regarding the
economic and social impact of counterfeiting and piracy” as factors that undermine
enforcement measures); USTR, supra note 5, at 30 (reporting on local protectionism despite
clear evidence of counterfeiting and on instances where local Chinese administrative offices
refused to refer cases for criminal prosecution even when thresholds were met).
43. William Hennessey, Deconstructing Shanzhai-China’s Copycat Counterculture:
Catch Me If You Can, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 609, 611 (2012). The literal translation of
“Shan Zhai” is “‘mountain stronghold,’ which in traditional Chinese popular culture refers to
the hide-out of bandits and other outlaws.” Id. For a detailed history and discussion on the
“Shan Zhai” culture and its impact on Chinese attitudes toward intellectual property rights,
see generally id.
44. Edward Tse, Kevin Ma & Yu Huang, Shan Zhai: A Chinese Phenomenon, BOOZ &
CO., 2–3 (2009), http://www.booz.com/media/file/Shan_Zhai_A_Chinese_Phenomenon
_en.pdf (describing the success of “Shan Zhai” companies like Tianyu’s knockoff mobile
phone handsets overtaking Lenovo’s in a mere two years and BYD’s rise as a “global leader
in car-battery technology”).
45. See Patricia E. Campbell & Michael Pecht, The Emperor’s New Clothes:
Intellectual Property Protections in China, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 69, 69 (2012).
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remarkably authentic and fooled even the employees working at them.46
Chinese authorities eventually uncovered as many as twenty-seven such
stores.47
What is more concerning to trademark holders and consumers alike is the
extent to which Chinese counterfeiting permeates the internet. Like fake
stores, websites that sell counterfeit goods are often designed to replicate
legitimate ones.48 Unlike fake stores, these sites allow counterfeiters to
market their products to consumers all over the world with ease.49 These
websites often display brand names and logos in attempts to pose as brand
vendors, so as to deceive consumers shopping for brand goods.50 And
when these websites appear in the same search result as websites for
legitimate products,51 the potential for consumer confusion is especially
salient.
Such confusion poses a real and potentially dangerous threat to
consumers and their well-being. Consumers who seek discounts on
authentic goods online often find themselves unwittingly purchasing the
counterfeit equivalent, which leads to frustration when those goods are of
lesser quality.52 This frustration can turn into physical danger with goods
like counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs.53

46. Id.; see also Melanie Lee, Fake Apple Store Even Fools Staff, REUTERS (July 22,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/22/us-apple-fake-idUSTRE76K482201107
22.
47. Campbell & Pecht, supra note 45, at 69–70. Apple is not the only brand to have
counterfeit stores in China. See Laurie Burkitt & Loretta Chao, Made in China: Fake Stores,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190429250457
6484080863377102.html (exposing fake Ikea, Subway, Dairy Queen, and Disney stores in
China).
48. The complaint in Tiffany I alleged that the defendants copied “the designs, patterns
and color schemes” associated with Tiffany products and expressly identified their products
as Tiffany products on their websites “in an effort to confuse consumers into believing that
they are buying versions of the Tiffany Products.” Complaint ¶¶ 2–3, Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D.
143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 9471).
49. See IACC Memorandum 2011, supra note 10, at 13 (noting the “continuing growth
in the use of the internet to promote, sell, and deliver counterfeits directly to consumers via
the post”).
50. See id.
51. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
52. See Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP), Counterfeit Shipments
Targeted As Part of ‘Operation Holiday Hoax’ at LAX (Dec 14, 2012), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/local/2012_news_releases/december_
2012/12142012_4.xml.
53. See Operation Apothecary Fact Sheet, NAT’L INTELL. PROP. RTS. COORDINATION
CENTER, http://www.iprcenter.gov/reports/fact-sheets/Operation%20Apothecary%20Fact%
20Sheet%20/view (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (“The consumer purchases the pharmaceutical
with the belief that the product advertised is a legitimate product, but in fact, is often
purchasing a counterfeit or unapproved version of the drug that has often been manufactured
in unsanitary conditions or not subjected to any safeguards or quality control regimes.”). For
an example of counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs seized in China, see Seized Some 10,000
Fake Viagra Pills, CHINA CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT INTELL. PROP. RTS. (Apr. 21, 2011),
http://english.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal191/tab43987/info298858.htm.
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C. Combating Counterfeiters
The sale of counterfeit goods over the internet specifically creates a
number of enforcement issues. The CBP’s seizure statistics from the past
five years indicates “a marked shift towards using international mail and
express courier services” for the transportation of counterfeit goods.54 This
increase is due in part to the “[c]ontinued growth of websites selling
counterfeit and piratical merchandise directly to consumers.”55 Individual
packages to consumers can be harder to detect compared to large cargo
shipments.56 The General Administration of Customs of the People’s
Republic of China (GAC)—the Chinese counterpart to the CBP—has also
noted a similar trend in exports.57
Regarding civil liability, the Second Circuit drew the line in Tiffany (NJ)
Inc. v. eBay Inc.58 on who could be held liable for counterfeit products sold
over the internet. EBay, the proprietor of an internet-based marketplace
that facilitates the purchase and sale of goods, “‘provides the venue for the
sale of goods and support for the transactions, but it does not itself sell the
items’ listed for sale on the site.”59 Thus, the Second Circuit held that eBay
was not liable for direct trademark infringement for displaying Tiffany’s
mark on its website60 or for contributory trademark infringement for merely
facilitating the sale of counterfeit products by its vendors.61
After eBay, brand owners focused their efforts on individual sellers and
their websites. Trademark owners started engaging in notice and takedown
54. CBP OFFICE OF INT’L TRADE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: FISCAL YEAR 2011
SEIZURE STATISTICS 15 (2011), available at http://www.iprcenter.gov/reports/ipr-centerreports/2011-seizure-statistics.
55. Id.; see also USTR, supra note 5, at 31 (noting that goods are increasingly “sold by
online traders in China (and elsewhere) and delivered to consumers by mail and express
delivery service”).
56. See China: Effects of Infringement, supra note 40, at 2-6 (“Counterfeits are
purchased online and shipped to the United States and other markets by postal and express
mail services, often in relatively small quantities that are difficult to detect.”).
57. Measures Taken, CHINA CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT INTELL. PROP. RTS.,
http://english.customs.gov.cn/tabid/43989/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2013)
(“[C]ustoms administrations at all levels throughout the country have enhanced the control
over the articles delivered by outward mails and express mails.”).
58. 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
59. Id. at 97 (quoting Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 475
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
60. See id. at 103.
61. See id. at 110. But see Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG (July 12, 2012),
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d5c68
7807beb24402baaceb362723ebed4.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4Oah4Le0?text=&docid=1
07261&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=589112
(holding that online marketplace proprietors may be liable in Europe if they were aware of
ongoing infringement but failed to expeditiously remove such content from their sites).
Brand owners have had some success in establishing liability for contributory trademark
infringement against web hosting companies that host infringing websites. See, e.g., Louis
Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011); Roger
Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. v. Prince, No. 2:09-2119-MBS, 2012 WL 1106775 (D.S.C. Mar.
30, 2012).
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procedures, in which he or she would send “notice of the infringing product
or content to the Internet Service Provider and request[] that the listing be
taken down.”62 Around this time, the National Intellectual Property Rights
Coordination Center (IPR Center) correspondingly instituted Operation in
Our Sites—targeting, investigating, and then seizing infringing websites
and redirecting them to display seizure notices.63 However, at best, these
procedures temporarily suspend sales and website owners can simply repost
their products on new websites with relative ease and little cost.64 This
phenomenon has been described as a “whack-a-mole” problem.65
Moreover, for any one trademark-protected product, there can be up to
hundreds or even thousands of websites selling the counterfeit versions of
that product.66 To counter this problem, trademark owners then began
bringing what Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum and David Ewen call “mass domain
lawsuit[s],” where “brand owners join, in one action, as many as five
hundred or more John Doe defendants, and target hundreds of counterfeit
websites.”67 Mass domain lawsuits, while undoubtedly more efficient than
individual notice and takedown procedures, still face the same permanence
issues.68
Thus, a different approach is to follow the money—targeting the funds
that finance counterfeiting operations.69 The Lanham Act authorizes
trademark owners to recover the profits that counterfeiters make from acts
of infringement, which could severely hinder a counterfeiter’s ability to
maintain his or her operation.70 Courts have held that when performing an
accounting of profits, district courts have the inherent power to freeze an
infringer’s assets “in order to ensure the availability of that final relief.”71

62. China: Effects of Infringement, supra note 40, at 2-10.
63. Operation In Our Sites, NAT’L INTELL. PROP. RTS. COORDINATION CENTER,
http://www.iprcenter.gov/reports/fact-sheets/operation-in-our-sites/view (last visited Mar.
19, 2013). Operation In Our Sites has been challenged on constitutional grounds. See
Agatha M. Cole, ICE Domain Name Seizures Threaten Due Process and First Amendment
Rights, ACLU (June 20, 2012, 4:54 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech-nationalsecurity-technology-and-liberty/ice-domain-name-seizures-threaten-due.
64. See China: Effects of Infringement, supra note 40, at 2-10 to -11.
65. See Ann Chaitovitz et al., Responding to Online Piracy: Mapping the Legal and
Policy Boundaries, 20 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 4 (2011); China: Effects of Infringement,
supra note 40, at 2-11.
66. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
67. See Lindenbaum & Ewen, supra note 10, at 569–70.
68. Lindenbaum and Ewen express doubts on the permanent effects of a mass domain
lawsuit. See id. at 598 (“Given the incredibly large number of counterfeit websites that
already exist, with new sites popping up every day, it is unlikely that the website owners can
be outpaced by only the mass domain lawsuits.”).
69. Robert Weigel, counsel for Tiffany, said that Tiffany’s strategy is to “pursue the
assets” and “follow the money.” See Emily Flitter, Insight: Gucci, Tiffany Target Chinese
Banks, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/04/uschina-usa-banks-fakes-idUSTRE7931ND20111004.
70. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
71. Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 559 (9th Cir. 1992); see
also Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 1995)
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As one court has said, the fact that the assets to be preserved are located in
China has no bearing on this inherent power if personal jurisdiction has
been found.72
However, even when the assets are frozen, access to the infringers’ bank
account records is required in order for a court to calculate the amount of
relief that is to be awarded. In an attempt to circumvent infringers who fail
to respond or appear, brand owners like Tiffany and Gucci have turned
directly to the banks where the infringers’ assets are held for access to their
bank records.73 Brand owners are able to identify specific banks and bank
accounts by tracking online payments made to the defendant’s websites.74
If brand owners are able to gain access to the assets and records belonging
to the infringers through the banks directly, then recovery is possible
without the defendants having to appear at all.
Brand owners Tiffany and Gucci have already begun testing this
approach. Starting with Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li75 (Gucci I),
Gucci obtained a preliminary injunction on July 12, 2010, restraining the
Similar
defendants’ assets76 and ordering expedited discovery.77
preliminary injunctions were granted to Tiffany in Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi78
(Tiffany I) and Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse79 (Tiffany II).
In each instance, Tiffany and Gucci served the New York branches of
each bank where the respective defendants’ assets were held with copies of
(holding that a “district court ha[s] the authority to freeze [assets that can be] used to satisfy
an equitable award of profits”).
72. See United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384 (1965) (“Once
personal jurisdiction of a party is obtained, the District Court has authority to order it to
‘freeze’ property under its control, whether the property be within or without the United
States.”).
73. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
74. Often, these websites will use companies like PayPal, Inc. to process their
customers’ credit card transactions and then transfer the profits to bank accounts in China.
See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. 143, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Occasionally, an “acquiring bank” is
used instead “to process online purchases by serving as an intermediary between the online
merchant and a credit card network such as Visa.” Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012
WL 1918866, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012). For a step-by-step explanation of the credit
card transaction process, see Visa International Operating Regulations Core Principles,
VISA, apps. A, B (Oct. 15, 2012), http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-coreprinciples.pdf.
75. No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2011 WL 6156936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011).
76. Citing “Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) and
[the] Court’s inherent equitable power,” the court declared that “any banks . . . who receive
actual notice of this order by personal service or otherwise, are . . . restrained and enjoined
from transferring, disposing of, or secreting any money, stocks, bonds, real or personal
property, or other assets of Defendants” Preliminary Injunction and Order Authorizing
Expedited Discovery at 6, Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS) (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010).
77. The preliminary injunction also granted “continued expedited discovery . . . as to
third parties, including any banking or other institutions, that received or transferred funds
from accounts maintained by Defendants.” Id. at 9.
78. Preliminary Injunction at 5–8, Tiffany I, No. 10 Civ. 9471(WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3,
2011).
79. Preliminary Injunction at 7–11, Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Aug 3,
2011).
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the preliminary injunctions and subpoenas for discovery.80 Ultimately, the
Banks complied with the subpoenas regarding documents that were located
in New York, but objected to the subpoenas for documents outside the
United States.81 The Banks asserted that Chinese bank secrecy laws
prevented them from complying with the subpoenas.82
D. Foreign Discovery
Drawing from the Tiffany and Gucci cases, this section discusses the
procedural mechanisms and rules for obtaining evidence to be used in
litigation.
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the discovery process in
actions brought before federal courts in the United States. Rule 45
provides that a subpoena may “command each person to whom it is directed
to . . . produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or
tangible things in that person’s possession, custody, or control.”83 Tiffany
and Gucci served the Banks with subpoenas under this rule.84
A Rule 45 subpoena is not the exclusive method for obtaining evidence.
When discovery involves documents located in a foreign nation, the Hague
Convention is a second option.
2. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters
The Hague Conference on Private International Law is a global
intergovernmental organization whose purpose is “to work for the
progressive unification of the rules of private international law.”85 The
Hague Conference achieves this goal through negotiating and drafting
multilateral treaties, called Hague Conventions.86

80. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *2; Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *2; Tiffany
I, 276 F.R.D. at 145. BOC, ICBC, and CMB were the banks served with one or more of
these subpoenas. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *2; Gucci Am., Inc., 2011 WL
6156936, at *2; Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 145.
81. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *2; Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *2; Tiffany
I, 276 F.R.D. at 146.
82. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
83. FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
85. Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law art. 1, Oct. 31, 1951,
15 U.S.T. 2228, 220 U.N.T.S. 121 (entered into force July 15, 1955).
86. See What Is the Difference Between the “Hague Conference” and the “Hague
Conventions”?, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en.
php?act=faq.details&fid=32 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
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In 1970, the Hague Conference adopted the Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters87 (Hague Evidence
Convention) for the purpose of “establish[ing] a system for obtaining
evidence located abroad that would be ‘tolerable’ to the state executing the
request and would produce evidence ‘utilizable’ in the requesting state.”88
The goal was to “reconcile different, often conflictive, discovery procedures
in civil and common law countries.”89 The Hague Evidence Convention
was signed by the United States in 1970 and ratified by the Senate in
1972.90 China acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention on December 8,
1997 with an entry into force date of February 6, 1998.91
Under the Hague Evidence Convention, evidence located abroad can be
obtained either by a letter of request or through a diplomatic officer,
consular agent, or commissioner.92 When a party to a suit commenced in
the United States seeks to obtain evidence located in China by a letter of
request, the presiding judge from the U.S. court is to transmit a letter of
request to the Chinese Central Authority.93 The Central Authority in China,
which is the Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China (MOJ),94
will forward the letter of request to the lower court sitting in the district in
which the evidence is located.95 The lower court will then serve the

87. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague
Evidence Convention].
88. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 530 (1987) (citations omitted).
89. Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/law/judicial/judicial_689.html (last visited Mar.
19, 2013).
90. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87.
91. See Status Table, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=82 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
92. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87; see also HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
CIVIL DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE § 15:6 (3d ed. 2010). For the purposes of this Note, only
the procedures for submitting a letter of request will be discussed, as China has declared that
the provisions for obtaining evidence through diplomatic officer, consular agent, or
commissioner will not be applicable. See Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 89. For the procedures for obtaining evidence
through a diplomatic officer, consular agent or commissioner, see Hague Evidence
Convention, supra note 87, arts. 15–22.
93. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87, art. 1 (“In civil or commercial
matters a judicial authority of a Contracting State may, in accordance with the provisions of
the law of that State, request the competent authority of another Contracting State, by means
of a letter of request, to obtain evidence, or to perform some other judicial act.”). A Central
Authority is designated by the contracting state “to receive Letters of Request coming from a
judicial authority of another Contracting State and to transmit them to the authority
competent to execute them.” Id. art. 2.
94. See Authorities, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=490 (last updated Feb. 3, 2011). The MOJ is also
the Central Authority for requests relating to criminal matters. See Agreement on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-China, art. 2, June 19, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13102,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/126977.pdf.
95. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87, art. 2.
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discovery request to the addressee.96 Any evidence that is produced is to be
returned to the U.S. court through the same channel by which the request
was made.97
Although the Hague Evidence Convention states that requests should be
executed “expeditiously,”98 the U.S. Department of State estimates that
letters of request can take a year or more to be fully executed.99 In 2008,
the Hague Conference sent out a questionnaire in an attempt to collect
information on the practical operation of several conventions.100 The
United States submitted a response to this questionnaire, reporting that it
received between 500 to 600 incoming letters of request annually from
2003 to 2007 but did not provide execution times for these incoming letters
of request.101 Hong Kong reported less than twenty incoming letters of
request annually in that same time period.102 Out of all the letters of
request that Hong Kong received in 2007, two were executed under two
months, one was executed between two and four months, one was retuned
unexecuted, and nine were currently pending at the time.103 China did not
submit a response.104 Furthermore, absent voluntary reporting from the
receiving country, the individualized nature of the Hague Evidence
Convention’s procedure for letters of request makes assembling statistics by
the requesting country a challenge.105 As a general comparison, letters of
96. See Authorities, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_
en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=243 (last updated Apr. 15, 2011).
97. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87, art. 13 (“The documents
establishing the execution of the letter of request shall be sent by the requested authority to
the requesting authority by the same channel which was used by the latter.”).
98. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87, art. 9.
99. See Preparation of Letters Rogatory, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/
law/judicial/judicial_683.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); see also Hague Convention on
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 89 (providing a
general estimate for all signatories to the Hague Evidence Convention).
100. See Publications, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=conventions.publications&dtid=33&cid=82 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
This questionnaire included a question on execution times for Hague Evidence Convention
letters of request. See Questionnaire of May 2008, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., 7–8
(2008), http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.publications&dtid=33&cid=82
(follow “Questionnaire of May 2008” hyperlink; follow “English” hyperlink).
101. Questionnaire of May 2008 Relating to the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE
INT’L L., 9–11 (2008), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008usa20.pdf (response from the
United States).
102. Responses to the Questionnaire of May 2008 Relating to the Hague Convention of
18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, HAGUE
CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., 4–6 (2008), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008hong
kong20.pdf (Response from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China).
103. See id. at 4.
104. Publications, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_
en.php?act=publications.details&pid=4457&dtid=33 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
105. This is because letters of request are sent directly from the presiding judge in the
U.S. court to the foreign country’s Central Authority. See supra note 93 and accompanying
text.
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request are at least faster than letters rogatory.106 The State Department,
which handles letters rogatory requests, reports that these requests can take
a years or more to be executed.107
The MOJ in China is only slightly more helpful on this point. The
MOJ’s website reports that it executed thirty seven requests in the first half
of 2010, but statistics for the years before or after that time period are
absent even though China has acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention
since 1997.108
Furthermore, Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention permits an
acceding country to the Evidence Convention to declare that it declines to
execute letters of request for pretrial discovery purposes.109 China has
specifically declared that it will only execute requests “clearly enumerated
in the letters of request and of direct and close connection with the subject
matter of the litigation.”110 Therefore, given the number of administrative
steps involved, obtaining evidence from China via a letter of request can be
time consuming and ultimately unfruitful.111
3. Rule 45 and the Hague Evidence Convention
In the years after the United States signed and ratified the Hague
Evidence Convention, courts struggled with how to use it, often deferring to

106. Letters rogatory are the customary method of obtaining judicial assistance from
abroad in the absence of a treaty or executive agreement.” Preparation of Letters Rogatory,
TRAVE.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/law/judicial/judicial_683.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2013).
107. Id.
108. See 2010 Niándù Shàng Bànnián Zhōngxīn Bànlǐ Sīfǎ Xiézhù Ànjiàn Tǒngjì
(2010年度上半年中心办理司法协助案件统计), MINISTRY JUST., http://www.moj.gov.cn/
sfxzjlzx/content/2010-07/23/content_2206673.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
109. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87, art. 23 (“A Contracting State may at
the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute Letters of
Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents as known in
Common Law countries.”); see also Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 89 (“The United States is seeking clarification from
the People’s Republic of China regarding its interpretation and implementation of the
Convention.”).
110. Declarations Notifications Reservations, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L.,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.comment&csid=493&disp=resdn (last visited
Mar. 19, 2013). The United States has not made an Article 23 reservation. See Declarations,
HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.
comment&csid=565&disp=resdn (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). See infra notes 144–47 for a
discussion on the United States’ and China’s divergent views on the discovery process.
111. In 2012, the Hague Conference re-launched work on the “Judgments Project,” which
focuses on cross-border litigation in civil and commercial matters. The Judgments Project,
HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.
display&tid=149 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). The “Judgments Project” had previously
considered including international enforcement measures for intellectual property law
judgments, potentially changing the landscape of intellectual property litigation. See
generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065
(2002).
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federal and state rules instead.112 Specifically, the courts were unsure if the
Hague Evidence Convention was to be treated as a discretionary or
exclusive method for obtaining evidence located abroad.113 The Supreme
Court clarified the relationship between the procedures set forth in the
Hague Evidence Convention and the discovery rules under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v.
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.114 The Court held
that the Hague Evidence Convention was “intended to establish optional
procedures” for obtaining evidence located abroad and does not preclude a
district court from ordering a foreign national party to produce evidence
physically located abroad under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.115
Under Aérospatiale, the Hague Evidence Convention is to be an option
whenever it will “facilitate the gathering of evidence.”116 When a district
court is deciding between ordering discovery pursuant to the Hague
Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Hague
Convention is not to be the “first resort.”117 The Hague Evidence
Convention will not always be the superior method; in certain situations,
proceeding under the Hague Evidence Convention might be “unduly time
consuming and expensive” and less likely to result in production of needed
evidence than “direct use of the Federal Rules.”118 District courts are thus
to engage in a fact-intensive inquiry, applying “scrutiny in each case of the
particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to those
procedures will prove effective” to determine how discovery should
proceed.119
4. Comity Analysis
Aérospatiale instructed district courts to conduct a “particularized
analysis” of the circumstances in each case but failed to articulate an
analytical framework for the courts to follow.120 Thus, to refine the
analysis courts in the Second Circuit adopted the five-factor test set forth in
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States,121
112. See Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures for Discovery Abroad,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1470–75 (1984) (citing unfamiliarity with the procedures and lack
of case law as reasons for the courts’ hesitation).
113. See id.
114. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
115. Id. at 538–40.
116. Id. at 541.
117. Id. at 542–43 (“A rule of first resort in all cases would therefore be inconsistent with
the overriding interest in the ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination’ of litigation in our
courts.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)).
118. Id. at 542.
119. Id. at 544.
120. Id. at 543; see also David J. Gerber, International Discovery After Aérospatiale: The
Quest for an Analytical Framework, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 521, 522 (1988).
121. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442(1)(c) (1987); see also Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, 249 F.R.D. 429, 438 (E.D.N.Y.
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under which a court confronted with foreign discovery is to consider
(1) “the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or
other information requested”; (2) “the degree of specificity of the request”;
(3) “whether the information originated in the United States”; (4) “the
availability of alternative means of securing the information”; and (5) “the
extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the state where the information is
located.”122
The Second Circuit also considers two additional factors: (6) “the
hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is
sought” and (7) “the good faith of the party resisting discovery.”123
5. China and the United States: A Comparison of Intellectual Property
Regimes, Discovery, and Procedure
When applying the seven-factor comity analysis, the more familiar a
court is with the legal system and interests of the foreign sovereign at issue,
the more likely the court’s decision between Rule 45 and the Hague
Evidence Convention will be an equitable one. Therefore, a review of
China’s legal system is prudent for the purposes of this Note.
China’s intellectual property regime provides civil, administrative,
customs, and criminal remedies for trademark owners against infringement.
Brand owners with registered trademarks in China are entitled to the
intellectual property rights and remedies under Chinese law.124 Suing in
China has several advantages. For the brand owners seeking to stop the
sale of counterfeit goods online, China is the principal locus of the dispute;
the defendants, evidence, banks, bank records, and funds are all located in
China. In China, intellectual property rights holders can pick between
China’s two-track system: the administrative branch or the intellectual

2008); Ssangyong Corp. v. Vida Shoes Int’l, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 5014(KMW)(DFE), 2004 WL
1125659, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2004) (discussing the then tentative draft of the
Revised Second Restatement).
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c).
123. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL
808639, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010) (quoting Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs.,
Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
124. The Trademark Office of the State Administration for Industry & Commerce of the
People’s Republic of China (SAIC) is responsible for trademark registration and
administration throughout China. See Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China,
supra note 42. The SAIC’s website provides a database of trademarks registered in China
searchable by trademark number, content, or name of applicant. Tiffany has 112 trademarks
registered under Tiffany and Company. See Trademark Search Results, TRADEMARK OFFICE
ST. ADMIN. FOR INDUSTRY & COM. CHINA, http://www.saic.gov.cn/sbjenglish/ (last visited
Mar. 19, 2013) (follow “Trademark search” hyperlink; click to enter; follow “Search of
general TM information (SGTMI)” hyperlink; search “Name of Registrant (English)” for
“Tiffany and Company”; follow “Tiffany and Company” hyperlink).
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property courts in the judicial system.125 The Chinese intellectual property
courts impose a six-month time limit on domestic intellectual property
cases, making for a quicker resolution.126 Disputes involving trademarks
are fairly common; from January to October 2011, China accepted 52,708
intellectual property cases, roughly 40 percent of which involved
trademarks.127
The administrative track is the more prevalent track, offering a “quick
and inexpensive alternative to civil and criminal enforcement.”128
However, pursuing administrative enforcement can be complicated, as
jurisdiction of intellectual property rights is spread over a number of
government agencies and offices depending on the type of intellectual
property rights and laws implicated.129 Furthermore, administrative
enforcement lacks “the investigation powers to access banking details and
emails, the power to open locked premises (including warehouses), the
authority to enter private residences and the power to detain suspected
infringers.”130
Similar to the CBP in the United States, the GAC enforces “customs
control” and “customs intellectual property protection” in China.131
However, the GAC requires the intellectual property rights holder to record
its intellectual property with the GAC and submit a written application “at
the suspected point of entry or exit where protection is sought” in order for
the GAC to seize the infringing goods.132 In the United States, the CBP just
requires trademarks to be registered with the USPTO and recorded with the
CBP.133
As a signatory to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, China must provide criminal
125. See Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, supra note 42 (“The first
and most prevalent is the administrative track, whereby an IP rights holder files a complaint
at the local administrative office. The second is the judicial track, whereby complaints are
filed through the court system.”).
126. Mark Cohen, China IP Time and the New York Minute, CHINA IPR, (Nov. 21, 2012),
http://chinaipr.com/2012/11/21/china-ip-time-and-the-new-york-minute/.
From 2006 to
2010, the average trademark infringement case was resolved in six months or less. See Ciela
Summary Report: Trend by Year, CIELA, http://www.ciela.cn/Content2.aspx?pageId=2&pp
Id=2&language=en (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (follow “Trend by Year” hyperlink; then
search “IP Right” for “Trade Mark” and search “Cause of Action” for “Infringement”)
[hereinafter Ciela Summary Report].
127. IACC Memorandum 2012, supra note 4, at 18.
128. Id. at 22.
129. The SAIC handles trademarks, the State Intellectual Property Office handles patents,
the National Copyright Administration of China handles copyrights, the General
Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine is involved with product
quality and standards, the State Drug Administration handles counterfeit pharmaceutical
products, and the Ministry of Culture also plays a role in the enforcement process. See
Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, supra note 42.
130. IACC Memorandum 2012, supra note 4, at 22.
131. Mission, GEN. ADMIN. CUSTOMS CHINA, http://english.customs.gov.cn/tabid/47802/
Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
132. See Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, supra note 42.
133. 19 C.F.R. § 133.1(a) (2012).
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enforcement of intellectual property rights for commercial scale piracy and
counterfeiting.134 Therefore, the Ministry of Public Security and the
Supreme People’s Procurate Security handle criminal investigation and
prosecution of intellectual property rights infringement.135 In recent years,
China has taken steps to increase intellectual property rights enforcement,
revising its copyright, patent, and trademark laws and even conducting a
government wide “Special IPR Enforcement Campaign” from October
2010 to June 2011.136 This campaign targeted intellectual property rights
violations ranging from “copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting
over the Internet, distribution of infringing optical discs and publications,
counterfeit cell phones, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, counterfeit seeds, and
counterfeit bulk commodities for export.”137 Overall, intellectual property
rights recognition and enforcement in China appears to be improving.138
Conversely, the intellectual property rights regime in the United States
has its advantages as well. Litigants bringing trademark infringement suits
in the United States enjoy familiarity with the U.S. legal system, the
potential recovery of higher damages, and a more expansive scope of
discovery.139
Million-dollar default judgments for damages in trademark infringement
suits are feasible and common in the United States.140 Damages in
134. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 61. In 2007, the United States filed a dispute with the
World Trade Organization claiming that China lacked proper criminal procedures and
penalties required under the TRIPS Agreement. See China—Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds362_e.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
135. Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, supra note 42. Civil actions
and administrative proceedings are more common, as “[f]oreign rights holders have had
considerably less success in encouraging criminal prosecution of IPR violations.” Id.
136. USTR, supra note 5, at 27. The National People’s Congress (NPC) recently
submitted a revised draft amendment to the Trademark Law in China for public comment.
See Shāngbiāo Fǎ Xiūzhèng Àn (Cǎo'àn) Tiáowén (商标法修正案（草案）条文), NAT’L
PEOPLE’S CONGRESS CHINA (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/
lfgz/flca/2012-12/28/content_1749326.htm. The NPC is considering imposing joint liability
on individuals who help facilitate trademark infringement. See id.
137. USTR, supra note 5, at 27; see also Program for Special Campaign on Combating
IPR Infringement and Manufacture and Sales of Counterfeiting and Shoddy Commodities,
INTELL. PROP. PROTECTION CHINA (Nov. 11, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.chinaipr.
gov.cn/newsarticle/news/government/201011/976869_1.html
(detailing
enforcement
measures taken by the Chinese government).
138. USTR, supra note 5, at 28 (“[T]he Chinese Government’s efforts during the Special
Campaign ‘generated goodwill’ among rights holders and sparked some cautious optimism
that a recognition of the need for IPR protection and enforcement in China may finally be
starting to take root.”).
139. See infra notes 140–47 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Default Judgment and
Permanent Injunction, Burberry Ltd. (US) v. John Doe 1, No. 11 CIV. 8306(TPG) (S.D.N.Y.
May 17, 2012), available at http://tinyurl.com/cb6s9yk (order granting default judgment for
$80,000,000); Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Hermes Int’l v. John Doe 1, No.
12 Civ. 1623(DLC) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
92046940/Hermes-v-Does-12-Civ-1623-S-D-N-Y-Apr-30-2012-Judgment (granting default
judgment for $100,000,000 and permanent injunction).
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trademark infringement suits in China, however, are often for less. From
2006 to 2012, the average amount of damages awarded in Chinese
trademark infringement cases ranged from 30,000 to 140,000 renminbi.141
Trademark infringement cases occasionally settle for larger amounts;
Apple, Inc. recently settled a lawsuit in China for $60,000,000 for the legal
right to use the iPad trademark in China.142 Although the TRIPS agreement
has harmonized certain aspects of intellectual property enforcement in
China,143 the remedies under U.S. law, as discussed above, are more
familiar, robust, and satisfying for brand owners who successfully pursue
their rights.
Furthermore, “[i]t is well known that the scope of American discovery is
often significantly broader than is permitted in other jurisdictions,”144 and
China is no exception. This difference in discovery scope has led to tension
between the United States and many other countries with more restrictive
discovery provisions.145 The common position taken by foreign countries
is that U.S. discovery procedures “may be applied to persons or documents
located in another state only with permission of that state.”146 The United
States however, has taken the position that “persons who do business in the
United States, or who otherwise bring themselves within United States
jurisdiction to prescribe and to adjudicate, are subject to the burdens as well
as the benefits of United States law, including the laws on discovery.”147
On August 31, 2012, China’s National People’s Congress passed an
amendment to its Civil Procedure Law.148 Key changes included the
availability of preliminary injunctions for all types of civil disputes, the
requirement of all legally effective judgments and rulings to be made
publicly available, and several new evidence rules.149 As Professor Mark

141. See Ciela Summary Report, supra note 126.
142. See Apple Finally Settles a Dispute over the iPad Trademark, It Costs Them $60
Million, BUS. INSIDER (July 2, 2012, 11:49 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/applesettles-dispute-ipad-name-60m-proview-2012-7.
143. See generally TRIPS, supra note 1, pmbl.
144. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 542 (1987).
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442,
reporters’ notes ¶ 1 (1987) (“No aspect of the extension of the American legal system
beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the
requests for documents in investigation and litigation in the United States.”). For an in-depth
discussion of the differences between American and Chinese discovery, see Meg Utterback
et al., Obtaining Discovery in China for Use in US Litigation, CHINA L. INSIGHT (Apr. 28,
2012),
http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2012/04/articles/dispute-resolution/obtainingdiscovery-in-china-for-use-in-us-litigation/.
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442,
reporters’ notes ¶ 1.
147. Id.
148. Ariel Ye et al., Insight into China’s Revision on Civil Procedure Law, CHINA L.
INSIGHT (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2012/10/articles/dispute-resolution
/insight-into-chinas-revision-on-civil-procedure-law/.
149. Id.
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Cohen has noted, the revised Civil Procedure Law can be seen as a step
toward increased transparency and more permissive discovery.150
Another provision that is relevant to the discovery process in trademark
infringement cases is Article 50(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, which grants
judicial authorities “the authority to order prompt and effective provisional
measures . . . to preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged
infringement.”151 Provisional measures include preliminary injunctions and
preliminary evidence or asset preservation measures.152
The tension between U.S. and Chinese discovery is highly relevant at the
pretrial discovery stage of trademark infringement suits. On one hand,
expansive pretrial discovery in the United States can help identify
additional defendants, such as suppliers and manufacturers of the
counterfeit goods, if the original defendants did not manufacture the goods
themselves.153 This information may never be uncovered in a foreign state
that does not provide for pretrial discovery or has restrictive discovery
rules.154
Chinese bank secrecy laws further exacerbate the tension between the
U.S. view on discovery and China’s. In Tiffany’s and Gucci’s trademark
infringement suits, the Banks have asserted that various provisions of
Chinese law would cause the Banks to be liable to the Chinese authorities
should they comply with the Rule 45 subpoenas for discovery.155 These
provisions impose civil and even criminal liability on banks that violate
them.156
Therefore, if a trademark owner ultimately decides to seek relief in the
United States, the trademark owner then has to bring the evidence from
China into the U.S. courts, opening itself up to the problems associated with
the extraterritorial location of the evidence, the risks associated with Hague
Evidence Convention requests, the divergent views on discovery, and the
implication of Chinese bank secrecy laws. It was with the foregoing
circumstances that the district courts in the Southern District of New York
decided how best to obtain the Chinese bank records belonging to
defendants.

150. Mark Cohen, Crossing the River by Feeling the IP Stones: How China’s Civil
Procedure System Benefits from Reforms Made in IP Civil Litigation, CHINA IPR (Nov. 8,
2012),
http://chinaipr.com/2012/11/08/crossing-the-river-by-feeling-the-ip-stones-howchinas-civil-procedure-system-benefits-from-reforms-made-in-ip-civil-litigation/#more-700.
151. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 50(1).
152. See Mark Cohen, “Case Filing” in China’s Courts and Their Impact on IP Cases,
CHINA IPR (Mar. 24, 2012), http://chinaipr.com/2012/03/24/case-filing-in-chinas-courts-andtheir-impact-on-ip-cases/.
153. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
154. In Gucci I, Judge Sullivan was especially concerned with the adverse impact reduced
discovery would have on the plaintiff’s ability to “fully prosecute their case.” See Gucci I,
No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2012 WL 5992142, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2012).
155. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
156. See Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 1918866, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 23,
2012); Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. 143, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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II. THE ABILITY OF TRADEMARK OWNERS TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
FROM NONPARTY FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
This part analyzes how district judges in the Southern District of New
York have approached the various arguments in support of the Hague
Evidence Convention and, conversely, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as the appropriate avenue for obtaining records from nonparty banks located
in China. It then examines the efforts of the parties to comply with the
resulting discovery orders and the current disposition of each suit.
A. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi
On December 20, 2010, Tiffany, manufacturer of luxury jewelry and
silverware, filed a complaint alleging that defendants Qi Andrew, Gu Gong,
Sliver Deng, and Kent Deng—all doing business as TiffanyStores.org,
Fashion Style, and Stores.org; ABC Companies; and several John Does157
(Tiffany I Defendants) manufactured and sold counterfeit Tiffany products
“without Tiffany’s permission, authorization, or approval” through several
websites hosted in the United States.158 Tiffany asserted that the Tiffany I
Defendants used PayPal, Inc. to process payments for sales through their
websites and transferred the profits to their BOC, ICBC, and CMB bank
accounts.159 On January 3, 2011, after the Tiffany I Defendants failed to
appear,160 the court entered a preliminary injunction against them, which
included discovery instructions directed at the Banks.161 Days later,
Tiffany served the Banks with copies of the preliminary injunction and
subpoenas specifically requesting
(1) communications concerning defendants or defendants’ accounts;
(2) documents containing contact information associated with defendants’
accounts; (3) documents relating to any and all credit card transactions
processed in connection with purchases from defendants or defendants’
websites; (4) documents concerning any open or closed checking, savings,
or money market accounts, and certificates of deposit held in the name of
any of the defendants, including bank statements; (5) documents
concerning any open or closed loans or mortgages relating to any of the
defendants; (6) wire transfer documents and files relating to any of the
defendants, including documents reflecting the source of funds for wires
into defendants’ accounts and (7) documents relating to Currency
Transaction Reports and Suspicious Activity Reports concerning any of
the defendants.162

157. Complaint at 1, Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 9471).
158. Id. ¶ 4. The complaint additionally alleged that the Tiffany I Defendants also copied
“designs, patterns and color schemes associated” with Tiffany and expressly identified their
products as Tiffany products to deceive consumers as to the authenticity of their products.
See id. ¶ 3.
159. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 145–46.
160. See id.
161. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
162. Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 145.
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The Banks searched their records, but did not find any accounts belonging
to the Tiffany I Defendants.163 The Banks objected to the subpoenas,
stating that they did not have “possession, custody or control” of any bank
documents located outside the United States and further objected to any
discovery requests, compliance with which would violate domestic or
foreign law.164
On July 25, 2011, Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman issued an order
addressing the Banks’ objections and Tiffany’s motion to compel
discovery.165 Judge Pitman found that the requested documents were in fact
within the Banks’ possession, custody, and control.166 As for the Banks’
secondary grounds for objection—that Chinese bank secrecy laws
prohibited them from complying with the subpoena—the judge conducted
the seven-factor comity analysis to determine whether the court should
compel discovery of the bank records in China.167
First, Judge Pitman considered the importance of the bank records to the
litigation.168 He agreed with Tiffany that the information requested was
“vital” because the requested documents had the potential to “reveal the
identities of those involved in the counterfeiting operation” and would
indicate if the funds from these bank accounts were used to create
counterfeit goods. The bank records could also identify manufacturers or
others involved in the operation, which could lead to other defendants.169
Tiffany’s requests, which included account numbers for some of the
defendants,170 were specific enough for the judge to find the second
factor—the degree of specificity of the request171—in favor of Tiffany.
However, Judge Pitman determined that the third through seventh factors
did not.172 For the third factor—whether the information originated in the
United States173—the requested bank records were clearly located in China
and were not accessible from the New York branches of the Banks.174 The
fourth factor questioned if the Hague Evidence Convention qualified as a
viable alternative to a Rule 45 subpoena, and the judge found that it did.175
163. The Banks searched only the records located in their New York branches. See id. at
145–46.
164. Id. at 146. The Banks offered to assist Tiffany in preparing a document request
pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention for the bank records at issue, but Tiffany turned
their offer down. Id.
165. See generally id.
166. See id. at 147–50.
167. See id. at 151 (“Where a party from whom discovery is sought asserts foreign law as
a bar to production, courts perform a comity analysis to determine the weight to be given to
the foreign jurisdiction’s law.”); see also supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
169. Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 151–52 (emphasizing that because the defendants had failed
to appear, production was all the more vital).
170. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 152.
171. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
172. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 160.
173. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
174. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 160.
175. See id. at 152–53.
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He examined China’s history with Hague Evidence Convention requests,
cases in the Southern District of New York addressing this particular issue,
expert opinions provided by Tiffany and the Banks, secondary sources, and
China’s Article 23 reservation when it acceded to the Hague Evidence
Convention.176
Judge Pitman relied heavily on language, albeit recently removed, from
the State Department’s website reporting China’s historically low response
rate to Hague Evidence Convention letters of requests.177 Specifically, he
found the removal of this language from the website particularly
compelling.178 He found additional support in MOJ reports of a 50 percent
execution rate over the past five years, with requests averaging six to twelve
months in processing time, and thirty-seven executed requests in the first
half of 2010 alone.179
The Judge proceeded to dismiss Tiffany’s remaining arguments for the
fourth factor based on the revision of the State Department’s website. He
declined to follow Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China,180 a case in the
Southern District of New York which had considered and rejected the
Hague Evidence Convention as a viable means of obtaining documents
from China, because Milliken was not binding precedent and, more
importantly, Milliken had relied on outdated language from the State
Department.181 He similarly found the expert opinions182 and secondary
sources183 that Tiffany and the Banks had proffered to not be particularly
“useful” since many of them had relied on the outdated language from the
176. See id. at 153–56.
177. The State Department had previously posted:
While it is possible to request compulsion of evidence in China pursuant to a letter
rogatory or letter of request (Hague Evidence Convention), such requests have not
been particularly successful in the past. Requests may take more than a year to
execute. It is not unusual for no reply to be received or after a considerable time
has elapsed, for Chinese authorities to request clarification from the American
court with no indication that the request will eventually be executed.
Id. at 153. The State Department’s website now states, “[t]he United States is seeking
clarification from the People’s Republic of China regarding its interpretation and
implementation of the Convention.” Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 89, at n.8.
178. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 153 (“[T]he deletion of the language from the State
Department’s Circular that is critical of China’s enforcement of Hague Convention requests
implie[d] that the conditions described by the omitted language no longer exist.”).
179. See id.
180. 758 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
181. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 154.
182. Tiffany’s experts—Donald Clarke, a professor at George Washington University
Law School, and William Alford, Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard Law
School—were skeptical of China’s treatment of Hague Evidence Convention requests while
the Banks’ experts—James Feinerman, professor of Asian Legal Studies at Georgetown
University Law Center, and Zhipan Wu, professor of law, Executive Vice Chancellor, and
Dean Emeritus at Peking University Law School—were optimistic. Id. at 154–55.
183. Tiffany cited a 2008 ABA paper, which reported low success in obtaining
documents from China through the Hague Evidence Convention, and a 2011 article, which
noted the difficulty of making Hague Evidence Convention requests directed at China. Id. at
155.
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State Department’s website as well.184 Judge Pitman was confident that
Tiffany’s document request was sufficiently related to the litigation, so
China’s Article 23 reservation would not be an issue.185 He stressed that
thirty-six other Hague Evidence Convention signatories had made similar
reservations as well.186 Acknowledging the “dearth of information as to the
current efficiency” of Hague Evidence Convention requests, the judge
nevertheless determined that requests to China would not be futile, relying
on the assumption that China’s response rate was in fact improving—an
assumption based on the removal of certain language from the State
Department’s website.187
Judge Pitman found that the fifth factor—interests of the states188—also
favored the Banks.189 He found China’s interest in enforcing its bank
secrecy laws to outweigh the United States’ interest in enforcing its
trademark laws and in adjudicating matters before its courts.190 He
considered the threat of civil and possible criminal sanctions the Banks
faced if they were to “disclose the requested information in contravention of
Chinese law”191 serious enough to rule the sixth factor—the hardship of
compliance192—in the Banks’ favor.193 The judge was also satisfied that
Chinese bank secrecy laws had been used in previous Chinese cases to
impose civil and even criminal liability on commercial banks, even if the
facts were not especially analogous.194 The judge furthermore suggested
that the onus was on Tiffany to demonstrate that the Banks would not face
negative consequences for complying with the subpoenas.195
Lastly, the judge found no evidence of bad faith by the Banks and ruled
the last factor—good faith of the party resisting discovery196—in their
favor.197 Thus, with five of the seven factors weighing in the Banks’ favor,
he directed Tiffany to proceed with discovery under the Hague Evidence
Convention, but he also preserved Tiffany’s right to “renew [its] application
184. See id.
185. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
186. Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 155–56 (“While it is not possible to conclude definitively
whether China would execute a request for the documents plaintiffs seek, the documents at
issue certainly appear to be closely related to the litigation, and, therefore, plaintiffs’ request
is not clearly prohibited by this reservation.”).
187. Id. at 156.
188. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
189. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 158.
190. Id. (“While the United States certainly has an interest in enforcing its orders and
protecting trademark rights, the Chinese interest in protecting its account holders’
confidentiality appears more significant in this case.”).
191. Id. at 160.
192. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
193. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 158 (noting that an order to compel discovery should
only be imposed on a nonparty in “extreme circumstances”).
194. See id. at 158–59 (citing Chinese cases where commercial banks in China were held
to be civilly and criminally liable).
195. See id. at 158.
196. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
197. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 160.
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to enforce [its] subpoenas” if the Hague Evidence Convention proved
futile.198
Tiffany followed the discovery orders but eventually renewed its
application on September 20, 2012.199 Before renewing its application,
Tiffany submitted a letter of request to the MOJ, but only received a portion
of the documents it requested nine months later.200 The MOJ had decided
not to produce certain documents that were lacking “direct and close
connections with the litigation” at hand.201 The MOJ’s partial production
was fully consistent with China’s Article 23 declaration on pretrial
discovery when it acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention.202
Unfortunately, the partial production amounted to information regarding
one BOC, one CMB, and three ICBC accounts in total, and questions such
as whether the Tiffany I Defendants had additional accounts at the Banks, if
there were any detailed wire transfer records, and whether the Banks had
complied with the asset restraint portion of the preliminary injunction,
remained unanswered.203
Despite this nine-month delay, Judge Pitman was not convinced that the
Hague Evidence Convention was futile, and on November 8, 2012, he
ultimately denied Tiffany’s renewed application to enforce the previous
subpoenas.204 The judge opined that the MOJ had unquestionably produced
documents that were relevant and responsive.205 Additionally, he did not
consider nine months to be “inordinately long given the delays inherent in
international discovery proceedings.”206 Although the judge acknowledged
that the resulting production was “more limited than it would have been
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” this result was the reality of
international litigation and foreign discovery.207 Furthermore, the judge
pointed out that additional discovery would not necessarily uncover the
source of the counterfeit goods.208
198. Id. at 160–61.
199. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi (Tiffany I), No. 10 Civ. 9471(RA)(HBP), 2012 WL
5451259, at *1 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 8, 2012).
200. See id. The MOJ produced “account opening documents (including the government
identification card of the account holder), written confirmation of certain transfers into the
accounts and a list of transfers out of the accounts.” Id.
201. See id. at *2.
202. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
203. Tiffany I, 2012 WL 5451259, at *1–2.
204. See id. at *2.
205. Id.
206. Id. (noting the lack of “statistical compilations” and citing personal experience).
207. Id. at *2–3 (“The high cost of discovery in federal litigation is well known, and the
fact that another sovereign chooses to take a more restrictive view of the appropriate scope
of pretrial discovery is not unreasonable.” (citations omitted)).
208. Id. The parties recently filed their responses to Judge Pitman’s November 8, 2012
order denying Tiffany’s renewed application. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum of Law in
Further Support of Their Objections to the November 8, 2012 Opinion and Order of
Magistrate Judge Henry Pitman, Tiffany I, No. 10 Civ. 9471 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013);
Response of Non-parties Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China to
Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Order Denying Plaintiffs Renewed Motion to
Compel the Production of Documents in China in Violation of Chinese Law, Tiffany I, No.
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B. Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li
Gucci I, is a similar trademark infringement suit brought by Gucci and its
affiliates against several websites and their operators209 (Gucci I
Defendants) six months before Tiffany filed its complaint in Tiffany I.210
Judge Richard J. Sullivan presided over the case.211 Much of the initial
pretrial proceedings paralleled Tiffany I: the complaint and alleged
infringement, the Gucci I Defendants’ failure to appear, and the preliminary
injunction.212 The main difference was that BOC was the only bank
implicated.213 Still, BOC took the same course of action—searching for
bank records only in its New York branch and objecting to documents
located outside the United States—when served with the preliminary
injunction and a subpoena for bank records belonging to the Gucci I
Defendants.214 The judge also applied the seven-factor comity analysis,215
but the similarities ended there.
Judge Sullivan found that the first two factors, concerning the importance
of the bank records to the litigation and the specificity of Gucci’s requests,
weighed in Gucci’s favor.216 He then determined that the third factor—
whether the information originated in the United States217—weighed in
BOC’s favor as the bank records were clearly located in China.218
As for the fourth factor—alternative means of securing the
information219—the judge disagreed with Judge Pitman, finding that the
Hague Evidence Convention was not a viable alternative for obtaining bank
records located in China.220 Notably, Judge Sullivan arrived at his

10 Civ. 9471 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013); Plaintiffs’ Objections to the November 8, 2012
Opinion and Order of Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman, Tiffany I, No. 10 Civ. 9471
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2012).
209. The named defendants include Weixing Li a/k/a Xin Li, Lijun Xu a/k/a Jack
London, Ting Xu a/k/a Jack London a/k/a Xu Ting a/k/a Rebecca Xu, Wenying Guo,
Xiaochao Shang, Lei Xu, Fengyuan Zhao, Liqun Zhao, Ming Zhao, and Peiyuan Zhao—all
doing business as Redtagparty, Myluxurybags.com, Kuelala.com, Xpressdesigners.com,
Xpressdesigner.net, and Designer Handbags; ABC Companies; and several John Does. See
Second Amended Complaint at 2, Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2011).
210. Complaint, Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010).
211. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1.
212. Compare Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1–2, with supra notes 157–61 and
accompanying text.
213. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1.
214. Compare Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *2, with supra notes 162–64 and
accompanying text.
215. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *5–12.
216. See id. at *6. The Gucci I Defendants’ bank records were “likely to provide the most
fruitful avenue for discovering the identity of additional infringers” and as a practical matter,
the records were “likely to provide the most effective measure of the revenues generated” by
the Gucci I Defendants. Id.
217. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
218. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *6.
219. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
220. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *7–9.
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conclusion from the same evidence and arguments presented in Tiffany I.221
Although Judge Pitman interpreted the revision of the State Department’s
website as a sign that China’s response rate was improving, Judge Sullivan
was not as optimistic, expressing skepticism over what seemed to be an
“unexplained revision.”222 Judge Sullivan was not willing to discount
Gucci’s expert opinions and secondary sources without “concrete evidence”
of China’s compliance with Hague Evidence Convention requests.223
Unlike Judge Pitman, Judge Sullivan did not require the Hague Evidence
Convention to be completely futile224 and instead cited language from
Aérospatiale stating that the Hague Evidence Convention is to be
considered a viable alternative as long as it was an “effective, or efficient,
method.”225 However, Judge Sullivan found the evidence to indicate that
the Hague Evidence Convention in this instance would be “unduly time
consuming and expensive, as well as less certain to produce needed
evidence than direct use of the Federal Rules” and therefore, that it was not
viable.226
Judge Sullivan also disagreed with Judge Pitman on the fifth factor,227
concluding that China’s interests did not outweigh those of the United
States.228 In addition to the United States’ interests in protecting
intellectual property rights and preventing consumer confusion, the judge
was also concerned with the Banks using Chinese bank secrecy laws as a
“shield against the requirements faced by other United States-based
financial institutions” and the possibility of counterfeiters utilizing foreign
banking secrecy laws to “facilitate global infringement schemes.”229
As for BOC’s hardship in complying with the subpoenas, Judge Sullivan
found the threat of sanctions too speculative for the sixth factor to favor the
Banks.230 Finally, the judge held that BOC’s opposition to the subpoena
was not in bad faith.231 Thus, with five of the seven factors weighing in

221. Compare id. at *7–9 (discussing MOJ’s statistics, now defunct language on the State
Department’s website, expert opinions, and secondary sources), with supra notes 176–86 and
accompanying text.
222. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *9.
223. Id.
224. Judge Sullivan stated that requiring the Hague Evidence Convention be deemed
futile in order to be considered an unviable means of obtaining evidence was “plainly in
tension with the Supreme Court’s rejection of a blanket rule requiring resort to Convention
procedures in the first instance.” Id. at *8 (citing Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale
v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 539 (1987)).
225. Id. (citations omitted).
226. Id. at *8 (quoting Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for
the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 542 (1987)).
227. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (interests of the states).
228. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *9–11.
229. See id. at *10–11.
230. Id. at *11; see also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
231. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *12 (noting, however, that it was “certainly
conceivable that Bank of China has actively assisted Defendants in concealing illegallyobtained profits”).
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Gucci’s favor, the judge granted Gucci’s motion to compel discovery under
the Rule 45 subpoena.232
Rather than complying with Judge Sullivan’s order, BOC resisted
production of the Gucci I Defendants’ bank records and instead filed
motions—albeit unsuccessful—for leave to appeal to request an extension
to comply with the discovery order and then for reconsideration of the
discovery order.233 On November 15, 2012, Judge Sullivan finally held
BOC in civil contempt and ordered the bank to pay a fine of $75,000 for
failing to comply with the discovery order despite having been given
multiple extensions and opportunities to be heard.234 The judge reasoned
that allowing BOC’s noncompliance to continue would produce grave
consequences.235 If BOC did not produce all of the documents responsive
to the 2010 Subpoena, Gucci’s ability to fully prosecute its case against the
Gucci I Defendants would be jeopardized.236 The judge was not
sympathetic to BOC’s contention that it was awaiting permission from
China to produce the Gucci I Defendants’ bank records, especially since
BOC had waited almost a year before seeking such permission.237
Therefore, any and all delay was solely attributed to BOC. Furthermore,
Judge Sullivan reiterated his position on the Hague Evidence Convention:
the Hague Evidence Convention would leave Gucci “empty-handed”
because the letters of request have “little likelihood of success.”238 This
case is currently on appeal to the Second Circuit and the contempt order has
been stayed.239
C. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse
On July 20, 2011, six months after Tiffany filed its complaint in Tiffany
I, Tiffany filed another complaint against a separate group of websites and
their operators240 (Tiffany II Defendants) alleging similar causes of action
232. See id.
233. See Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2012 WL 5992142, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15,
2012). BOC did produce documents for two of the nine accounts listed in the original
subpoena but this limited production was in itself incomplete as it lacked documentation of
deposits and withdrawals associated with the two accounts. Id. at *2.
234. See id. at *9. It had been over a year since Judge Sullivan’s discovery order was
issued. See id. at *2–3.
235. Id. at *8.
236. Id.
237. See id. at *7.
238. Id. at *6. Judge Sullivan’s statement about the Hague Evidence Convention came
eight days after Magistrate Judge Pitman deemed the Hague Evidence Convention a viable
means for obtaining evidence located in China. See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying
text.
239. Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2011 WL 6156936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011),
appeal docketed, No. 11-3934 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 2011). The Second Circuit will be hearing
the Gucci I and Tiffany II appeals in tandem. See Order, Gucci Am. Inc v. Li, No. 11-3934
(2d Cir. Jan. 16, 2013) (directing appeals to be heard in tandem).
240. The named defendants include Bruce Forbse, Chen Jia Wen, Gimi Wooten, Hu Xin
Xing, Alyarica Ltd., Tiffany Jewelries Inc., Tiffany-Gifts Inc., United Merchants, Ltd, and
Web Sale Merchants LLP—all doing business as Tiffany-Collections.com, Tiffany-
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and infringing activity as in Tiffany I and Gucci I.241 Judge Naomi Reice
Buchwald presided over Tiffany II.242 The pretrial proceedings for Tiffany
II progressed in a similar fashion as the prior cases.243 While all three
banks were implicated in this suit, BOC played a special role as the
acquiring bank for one of the infringing websites.244 For sales over the
internet, an acquiring bank serves as an “intermediary between the online
merchant and a credit card network such as Visa” and “is also often
responsible for performing due diligence on the merchant and accordingly
often accepts the risk of ‘chargebacks,’ meaning customer disputes that
result in a reversal of a transaction.”245
On May 23, 2012, Judge Buchwald directed Tiffany to use the Hague
Evidence Convention for the Tiffany II Defendants’ bank records at ICBC
and CMB.246 However, because of BOC’s role as an acquiring bank, the
judge separately ordered BOC to comply with the “discovery provisions of
the preliminary injunction.”247
The seven-factor comity analysis that Judge Buchwald conducted
resulted in three of the seven factors weighing in favor of CMB and ICBC
and only two of the seven factors for BOC.248 Despite Tiffany garnering a
majority of the factors against all three banks, the judge allowed ICBC and
CMB to proceed through the Hague Evidence Convention rather than
comply with the Rule 45 subpoenas.249 She reasoned that China should be
given the opportunity to demonstrate its cooperation under the Hague
Evidence Convention as a first instance and that future courts could “take
notice and adjust their analysis” should it prove futile.250
The judge took a different approach with BOC. BOC’s role as an
acquiring bank bolstered factors one—the importance of the documents
requested251—and seven—the good faith of the party resisting
discovery252—thus tipping the balance in Tiffany’s favor.253 Specifically,

Gifts.com,
Tiffany-Jewelries.us,
TiffanyInsideSales.com,
UK-Tiffany-Gifts.com,
Best10Brands.com, and Trusted-Seller.eu; ABC Companies; and several John Does. See
Complaint at 1–2, Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2011).
241. Compare id., with supra notes 157–59, 210 and accompanying text.
242. Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 1918866, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 23,
2012).
243. Compare id. at *1–2, with supra notes 160–64, 212–14 and accompanying text.
244. Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *1–2. BOC was the acquiring bank for
TiffanyOutletStore.com. Id. See supra note 74 for an explanation of the role of an
“acquiring bank.”
245. Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *2.
246. See id. at *13.
247. See id. at *11.
248. CMB and ICBC had the third, fourth, and seventh factors ruled in its favor while
BOC only had the third and fourth. See id. at *4–7.
249. Id. at *10–11.
250. Id. at *10 (“China has yet to have a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate whether
it will comply with a Hague Convention request under these circumstances.”).
251. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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the court believed that through the due diligence that BOC was required to
perform in order to become an acquiring bank, and from its active role as an
acquiring bank BOC was in possession of “valuable information as to the
identity, business activities, and even location of one or more
defendants.”254 It was possible that BOC even had information on where
the Tiffany II Defendants were depositing their profits.255 The judge was
suspicious of BOC’s ability to confirm that TiffanyOutletStore.com—a
website with the word “Tiffany” in its name—was using its payment
systems, suggesting that BOC was withholding crucial evidence.256
Furthermore, Judge Buchwald’s May 23, 2012 order brought new
developments in this conflict to light. The judge revealed that according to
Tiffany’s expert opinions, the Chinese government holds large ownership
interests in all three banks, making the threat of sanctions highly
doubtful.257 This information hurt the Banks in the sixth factor—the
hardship of compliance.258 She was also the first to address a November 3,
2011 letter from the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)—two financial regulatory bodies
in China—to four judges of the Southern District of New York with similar
cases pending on their dockets.259
In this letter, the PBOC and CBRC urged the judges to utilize the Hague
Evidence Convention and assured the judges that they would “actively
coordinat[e] with the PRC Ministry of Justice and judicial organs in the
PRC” to ensure timely execution of any letters of request.260 The judge
interpreted this letter as an expression of the Chinese government’s
intention to establish the Hague Evidence Convention as a viable alternative
means for obtaining evidence in China, thus allowing the fourth factor to
weigh in favor of the banks.261 With respect to the fifth factor—the interest
of the states262—however, the court found the interests of both China and

253. Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *11 (noting that BOC’s role “strengthen[ed] the
importance of the information sought and suggest[ed] potential bad faith on behalf of
BOC”).
254. Id. at *5 (noting that the due diligence generally performed on merchants with whom
a bank works with often includes physical inspections of the merchant’s premises).
255. Id.
256. See id. at *10 (“[I]t would seem possible, if not likely, that BOC could have
identified the infringing website based on a simple search of its records.”).
257. Id. at *9 (“[T]he Chinese government either directly or indirectly owns 67% of the A
shares in BOC, 70% of the A shares in ICBC, and over 25% of the shares in CMB.”).
258. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; see also Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866,
at *9.
259. Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *6. The letter was addressed to Judges Sullivan,
Pauley, Pitman, and Batts. Id. at *6 n.7.
260. Id. at *6.
261. Id. at *7 (“It would seem prudent to forebear from assuming that the Hague
Convention is not a viable option until Chinese authorities have had a meaningful
opportunity to comply with similar requests but have failed to do so.”).
262. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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the United States to be equally compelling and thus determined that neither
interest predominated.263
BOC has appealed Judge Buchwald’s order to comply with the Rule 45
subpoena, along with ICBC and CMB, which both appealed on separate
grounds.264
D. Additional Cases
The Banks are also involved in at least three additional cases in the
Southern District of New York that implicate the seven-factor analysis.
Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd.265 is a wrongful death action brought against
BOC arising out of a 2006 suicide bombing in Tel Aviv.266 While the
factual circumstances of this case are inapposite to the previous three cases,
this case was filed in the Southern District of New York and involves
obtaining bank records in China and China’s handling of Hague Evidence
Convention requests.267 In Wultz, it had been over a year since the
plaintiffs sent the MOJ their Hague Evidence Convention request and so, on
October 29, 2012, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin granted the plaintiff’s motion
to compel discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In arriving
at her decision, the judge emphasized that despite numerous discovery
orders in several other pending cases, BOC had yet to be sanctioned by the
Chinese government and that it was evident that the MOJ had “chosen not
to defer to the relatively broad scope of American discovery” in handling
Hague Evidence Convention requests.268 On January 10, 2013, in response
to BOC’s contentions as to what documents were subject to production
under the October 29, 2012 order, Judge Scheindlin issued another order
clarifying exactly which categories of documents BOC was required to
produce.269 Judge Scheindlin stated that the October 29 order did not
require BOC to automatically produce certain documents and
communications from BOC to the Chinese government whose “disclosure
is specifically and categorically prohibited” under “Article 5(1) of the Antimoney Laundering Law of the PRC; Articles 7, 15(2) and 16 of the Rules
for Anti-money Laundering by Financial Institutions; and Article 6 of the
Measures for the Administration on Financial Institutions' Reports of Large-

263. Id. at *8 (finding the possibility of “transnational counterfeiters” using such laws as
a shield from the consequences of their unlawful actions worrisome).
264. Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 1918866 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012),
appeal docketed, No. 12-2317 (2d Cir. June 7, 2012).
265. No. 11 Civ. 1266(SAS), 2012 WL 5378961 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2012).
266. See id. at *1.
267. See id. The court noted that this was not the first time “a party has sought the
production of documents by BOC, BOC has objected that production would threaten it with
civil and criminal liability under China’s Bank Secrecy Laws, and a court has responded by
applying the Second Circuit’s multi-factor comity test.” Id. at *3.
268. Id. at *3.
269. See Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 1266(SAS), 2013 WL 132664
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2013).
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sum Transactions and Suspicious Transactions.”270 BOC was required,
however, to produce any documents and communications to the Chinese
government “outside the course of ‘regular regulatory reviews.’”271 In
exempting certain documents from production, the judge reasoned that,
while previous application of the seven-factor comity analysis to Chinese
bank secrecy laws favored production, application of the same test to the
regulatory laws at issue in the January 10, 2013 order demanded the
opposite result.272 Specifically, the judge awarded more deference to the
regulatory laws at issue because they were geared towards combating
money laundering—one of the central interests considered in the October
29 order.273
In Gucci America, Inc. v. Bagsmerchant, LLC274 (Gucci II), Gucci filed a
complaint against several websites and their operators275 (Gucci II
Defendants) on April 5, 2010.276 Judge Scheindlin is the presiding judge on
this case as well.277 On July 8, 2011, she entered a default judgment in the
amount of $7,800,000 against the Gucci II Defendants but vacated that
judgment on September 27, 2012.278
Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Dong,279 is yet another trademark infringement suit
Tiffany brought on March 30, 2011 against several websites and their
operators280 (Tiffany III Defendants).281 Judge George B. Daniels entered
default judgment against the Tiffany III Defendants on March 22, 2012 and
the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Frank Maas.282

270. Id. at *1–2.
271. Id.
272. Id. at *1.
273. Id. The parties are currently tied up in discovery. See Wultz, No. 11 Civ. 1266(SAS)
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2013).
274. No. 10 Civ. 2911(SAS), 2012 WL 4468192 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012).
275. The named defendants include Bagsmerchant, LLC; Bagsmerchant.Co; Bags Store
Ltd. a/k/a www.bags-store.com; Yunjing LLC; Authentictrading Ltd.; Yi Wang; Wu
Xianhui; Yu Zhang; Jason James a/k/a Jason Mioto a/k/a Jermen Mioto;
www.bagsdeal.com—all doing business as www.bagsmerchant.com; ABC Companies; and
John Does. See id. at *1.
276. Complaint, Gucci II, No. 10 Civ. 2911 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5. 2010).
277. See Gucci II, No. 10 Civ. 2911(SAS), 2012 WL 4468192 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012).
278. See id. at *1. BOC and CMB successfully argued that the default judgment was the
equivalent of an ex-parte turnover order, which required special proceedings. Id. at *2.
279. No. 11 Civ. 2183(GBD)(RM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011).
280. The named defendants include Alice Dong, Alice Huang, Fiona Jones, Le Tian, Lin
Feng a/k/a Feng Lin, Shi Zhonghua, Wang Zhi Rong, Yan Zhou—all doing business as
TiffanyintheBox.com, 925JewelryBox.com, Tiffany4Girls.com, 925JewelrySale.com,
PandoraOutlets.com,
925JewelryStore.com,
925Store.org,
JewelrySetSale.com,
SilverCharmSales.com, Xingren Co. Ltd., GZ Chang Min Net S&T Co., Bangrui
Information and Technology Co. Ltd., Shanghai RongJiao Electronic Business Co., and
Shanghai Changbang Le Tian Service Co.; ABC Companies; and John Does. Complaint at 2,
Tiffany III, No. 11 Civ. 2183(GBD)(RM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011).
281. See id.
282. Default Judgment Order, Tiffany III, No. 11 Civ. 2183(GBD)(RM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
22, 2012).
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III. ADVERSE PRESUMPTIONS AND PLACING THE BURDEN ON
FOREIGN CENTRAL AUTHORITIES TO INCREASE TRANSPARENCY
A review of Tiffany I, Gucci I, and Tiffany II reveals serious transparency
problems with the Chinese Central Authority and, more importantly, the
ability of a Hague Evidence Convention request to undermine the “just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination” of trademark infringement suits.283
Moreover, clarification on the appropriate avenue for obtaining evidence
located in China is imperative, as there are at least two pending cases where
this issue is highly relevant.284 Rather than offering foreign countries
“meaningful opportunities”285 to demonstrate their cooperation—while
domestic litigants bear the costs—whenever there is uncertainty on the
proper course of foreign discovery, courts should adopt a presumption
against the country’s cooperation, with the burden on the foreign
government to indicate otherwise.
This part will assess the reasoning in Tiffany I, Gucci I, and Tiffany II and
suggest how courts should view the Chinese legal system when evaluating
the viability of the Hague Evidence Convention.
A. Lost in Translation: Misconceptions of the Chinese Legal Landscape
Tiffany I is illustrative of the risks associated with requesting evidence
pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention. Although Judge Pitman was
not concerned with China’s Article 23 reservation under the Hague
Evidence Convention,286 this reservation was the reason that substantial
portions of Tiffany’s document requests were denied.287 While the MOJ’s
discretion on the scope of production is consistent with China’s Article 23
reservation,288 it has drastically reduced Tiffany’s ability to uncover the
source of the counterfeit goods and to identify additional defendants.289
Even if Judge Pitman was to now grant additional discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it has been over two years since the
complaint in Tiffany I was filed. The evidence and funds that Tiffany seeks
are likely long gone. Not only are Hague Evidence Convention requests
time consuming, but Tiffany I demonstrates the ability of such requests to
ruin subsequent discovery attempts to uncover time sensitive information.
Judge Sullivan’s concern that plaintiffs will not be able to fully prosecute
their cases against their infringers when a court declines to compel
discovery was realized in Tiffany I.290

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See supra note 117 (language from Aérospatiale).
See supra notes 276–82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 250, 261 and accompanying text.
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 236, 238 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, provisional evidence preservation measures, as authorized by
the TRIPS Agreement, can be extremely useful in these situations.291
Litigants who have been ordered to conduct discovery through the Hague
Evidence Convention should consider asset and evidence preservation
measures in China while their letters of request are pending. However,
litigants should tread carefully, as Chinese courts have not been employing
evidence preservation measures to their fullest extent.292 Fortunately, the
recent amendments to China’s Civil Procedure Law could lead to increased
use of preliminary injunctions.293
Secondly, each judge to subsequently address the threat of sanctions by
the Chinese government clearly grew increasingly skeptical.294 As Judge
Buchwald pointed out, the threat of sanctions is hardly credible when the
Chinese government possesses large ownership interests in all three
banks.295 The Chinese government, as signatory to the Hague Evidence
Convention and owner of substantial interests in the Banks, should arguably
be more compliant with the letters of request.296 Additionally, the fact that
BOC subsequently produced certain documents, albeit minuscule, in
accordance with the discovery order in Gucci I, also casts serious doubts as
to the reality of sanctions.297 Furthermore, the court in Wultz pointed out
the absence of a single instance of sanctions against the Banks in the two
years since the first time the Banks raised this argument.298 The threat of
sanctions was their main argument for resisting discovery, and this
argument has become increasingly questionable.299
Moreover, related to the issue of sanctions was China’s interest in
enforcing its bank secrecy laws. Judge Pitman was the only judge to
consider this interest to outweigh the United States’ interest in enforcing its

291. See Cohen, supra note 152 (“Preliminary evidence preservation measures can be
especially critical when evidence is ephemeral, such as in the on-line environment.”).
292. See id.
293. See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., supra note 268 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
296. Main Functions and Responsibilitys of SASAC, ST.-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION &
ADMIN. COMMISSION ST. COUNCIL (SASAC), CHINA, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/
n2963340/n2963393/2965120.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (“[T]he State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) performs
investor’s responsibilities, supervises and manages the state-owned assets of the enterprises
under the supervision of the Central Government (excluding financial enterprises), and
enhances the management of the state-owned assets.”). The SASAC’s guidelines on
corporate social responsibility call for state-owned enterprises to “comply with regulations
and laws, public ethnics [sic] and commercial conventions, and trade rules,” to “protect
intellectual property rights, keep business creditability, oppose improper competition and
eradicate corruption in commercial activities.” Guidelines to the State-Owned Enterprises
Directly Under the Central Government on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities, ST.OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION & ADMIN. COMM’N ST. COUNCIL (SASAC), CHINA,
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n13933222/14125651.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
297. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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intellectual property rights.300 Surprisingly, none of the courts considered
China’s interest in intellectual property rights enforcement. China’s recent
revisions to its copyright, patent, and trademark law, coupled with recent
steps to improve enforcement, suggest that intellectual property rights
enforcement is a compelling interest to China as well.301 From a policy
standpoint, several of the judges were concerned with the potential for
abuse should the courts continue to defer to the Hague Evidence
Convention and thereby impede the enforcement of intellectual property
rights. Specifically, Judge Sullivan was concerned with foreign banking
institutions shirking the requirements that domestic banking institutions
faced,302 and Judge Buchwald was apprehensive of transnational
counterfeiters avoiding liability for their unlawful actions.303 Article 41 of
the TRIPS Agreement requires member states to adopt specific enforcement
procedures against infringement of intellectual property rights, which are to
“be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to
legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.”304 As a
member of the World Trade Organization, China has an obligation under
the TRIPS agreement to enforce intellectual property rights,305 and the
discretionary nature in the execution of Hague Evidence Convention
requests threatens to create a loophole for counterfeiters to avoid liability to
U.S. rights holders.
Finally, the fact that the courts recognized that their orders were based on
the acknowledged lack of information on China’s handling of Hague
Evidence Convention request is disconcerting. Additionally, there were
several issues with the evidence that the courts utilized. The courts noted
that China had executed thirty-seven requests in the first half of 2010.306
However, the MOJ’s website, the source of this statistic, does not provide
any figures for the years before or after the first half of 2010.307 With no
context in which to consider that statistic, it is not informative. Another
oversight is in the discussion of the Chinese cases where commercial banks
in China were subject to civil and even criminal liability.308 China is a civil
law country rather than common law and, therefore, direct analogizing of
cases was misplaced, especially when these cases were made known to the
court via expert opinions rather than judicial interpretation or other more
official guidance.309
300. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 124–38 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
304. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 41.
305. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
309. Keshia B. Haskins, Special 301 in China and Mexico: A Policy Which Fails To
Consider How Politics, Economics, and Culture Affect Legal Change Under Civil Law
Systems of Developing Countries, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1125, 1144
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Perhaps the biggest misconception about the Chinese legal system is the
response time with which to measure whether the Hague Evidence
Convention is a viable means of obtaining evidence. The State Department
and several of the courts stated that Hague Evidence Convention requests
can take anywhere from six to twelve months.310 When the MOJ finally
executed Tiffany’s request after nine months, Judge Pitman was satisfied
with the timing of the execution based on his personal experience.311 While
six, nine, or even twelve months might be acceptable timeframes for
discovery in the United States, none of the courts compared this timeframe
to average timeframes in China.312 Domestic intellectual property court
proceedings in China have a six-month time limit.313 Judge Pitman failed to
consider the time limits in China, or the States’ or other similar countries’
reciprocal timeframes for letters of request, before signing off on the MOJ’s
nine-month timeframe.
Although the letter from PBOC and CBRC shed light on the Chinese side
of the Hague Evidence Convention debate, the authority of this letter is
questionable.314 The MOJ is the Central Authority, which handles the
execution of Hague Evidence Convention requests.315 A similar letter from
the MOJ would undoubtedly be authoritative and deference would be
warranted. However, the PBOC and CBRC are regulatory bodies for the
banking industry in China.316 Although the PBOC and CBRC may be
considered part of the Chinese government, their authority over Hague
Evidence Convention requests or its power to influence the MOJ as the
Central Authority is largely unclear.
B. Adverse Presumption As a Policy To Facilitate
Foreign Evidence Gathering
All of the above issues, concerns, and misconceptions can be eliminated
if the courts adopt a uniform policy. This policy should be a presumption
against the viability of a Hague Evidence Convention request whenever
there is a lack of transparency with the foreign state. The burden should be
placed on the foreign state’s Central Authority to clearly establish that it
will, in fact, cooperate under the terms of the Hague Evidence Convention
in a timely and efficient manner. This will eliminate the need for U.S.
courts to speculate on foreign governmental matters when deciding on
pretrial issues.317 An adverse presumption rule will also incentivize foreign

(1999) (noting that Chinese “[j]udges do not base their decisions on detailed analysis and
case law analogy partly because civil law systems do not recognize stare decisis”).
310. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 177–78, 180–84, 223–24 and accompanying text.
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governments to increase the transparency of their laws and international
litigation policies.
Increasing transparency and cooperation from China is consistent with
numerous trade organizations and the U.S. government’s current trade and
intellectual property rights enforcement policies. In 2011, the International
AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC) recommended to the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) the need for “Chinese authorities [to] increase the
level of transparency in their handling of counterfeiting, piracy and other IP
violations.”318 Specifically, the IACC emphasized “the need to establish
clearer benchmarks for progress by individual ministries, with statistics for
enforcement published more regularly, broken down by region, and broken
down by reference to the exact law under which penalties are imposed.”319
The U.S. government’s commitment to protecting the intellectual
property rights of Americans in foreign markets is evidenced by joint law
enforcement efforts like Operation In Our Sites320 and USTR’s Notorious
Markets List,321 targeting “infringing foreign-based and foreign-controlled
websites.”322 Increased efforts by the U.S. government to encourage and
work with the Chinese government to enforce intellectual property rights
suggests that a policy on adverse presumption that encourages transparency,
facilitates discovery, and even recovery by intellectual property rights
holders would be compatible.
Finally, with the amendments to China’s Civil Procedure Law requiring
Chinese courts to make legally relevant decisions publicly available,
decisions on other Hague Convention requests and instances where banks
were actually subjected to liability under bank secrecy laws should now be
made available to interested parties.323 This would be in line with reading
China’s Civil Procedure Law amendments as a step toward increased
transparency.324 Conversely, as discovery becomes more permissive under
China’s Civil Procedure Law,325 China’s previous Article 23 declaration
under the Hague Evidence Convention326 will begin to hold less weight as a
reason for declining production under the Hague Evidence Convention.
This could potentially result in the increased viability of the Hague
Evidence Convention for Chinese evidence.
Judge Sullivan’s approach in Gucci I best illustrates this proposal. Judge
Sullivan was unwilling to deem the Hague Evidence Convention a viable
IACC Memorandum 2012, supra note 4, at 23.
Id.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., 2011 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT
31 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_
annual_report_mar2012.pdf.
323. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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320.
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means for obtaining evidence in China absent concrete evidence
establishing that it was.327 Furthermore, the State Department could
improve on its transparency as well since many of the judges cited the State
Department in their cases.328 The State Department should maintain up-todate reports on details like response rates and timing. Proactive measures to
keep the courts informed on the status of Hague Evidence Convention
signatories by the State Department would eliminate the need for judges to
resort to deciphering the significance in oracular changes to the State
Departments’ website.
CONCLUSION
Global counterfeiting calls for global enforcement of intellectual property
rights. As governments increase enforcement measures through customs
and criminal prosecution, so too must civil enforcement. Therefore, the
U.S. legal system must provide an efficient method for obtaining evidence
located abroad to ensure that trademark owners are able to attain final relief.
Consistent with the global movement toward increased recognition and
enforcement of intellectual property rights, U.S. courts should adopt an
adverse presumption against the Hague Evidence Convention whenever
enforcement of the intellectual property owner’s rights are threatened by the
opaque handling of the receiving Central Authority. This policy is
consistent with the holding in Aérospatiale (i.e., proceeding with the Hague
Evidence Convention only when doing so would be efficient and effective),
while promoting “just” and “speedy” resolution of intellectual property
disputes.

327. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 179–89, 224–26 and accompanying text.

